The Internet continues to evolve a s i t r e a c hes out to a wider user population. The recent introduction of user-friendly navigation and retrieval tools for the World Wide Web has triggered an unprecedented level of interest in the Internet among the media and the general public, as well as in the technical community. It seems inevitable that some changes or additions are needed in the control mechanisms used to regulate access to Internet resources. In this paper, we argue that a feedback signal based on the price a user pays for network service is a workable tool to aid network operators in controlling Internet tra c. We suggest that these prices should vary dynamically based on the current utilization of network resources. We s h o w h o w this responsive pricing puts control of network service back where it belongs : with the users.
Introduction
A communications network is as good, or as bad, as its users perceive it to be. Network performance should therefore be measured in terms of overall user satisfaction with the service they receive.
However network performance is usually expressed in terms of network engineering measures such as average packet delay or loss rate. These engineering measures are an imperfect re ection of overall user satisfaction because user requirements vary widely, i n e v ery service dimension and over time.
As a natural extension of existing network feedback c o n trol mechanisms, we propose bringing users back into the loop and thereby ensuring that performance measures are user-oriented (see Figure 2 ). We propose a form of feedback which w e call responsive pricing and argue that 1 Our emphasis on increasingly controlling network congestion at the periphery echoes the views expressed by D a ve Clark in his contribution to this volume 3].
it represents a particularly useful mechanism for maximizing network value. Users would gain by obtaining service more closely matched to their needs network operators would gain through improved network utilization and increased user satisfaction with the service they receive. Network engineering measures will continue to be important t o n e t work owners and operators, but we believe that user preferences should be the primary consideration driving resource allocation and congestion control schemes. 
Two de nitions of e ciency
In focusing on user preferences, we need to distinguish two v ery di erent notions of e ciency:
Network e ciency refers to the utilization of network resources, such as bandwidth and bu er space.
Economic e ciency refers to the relative v aluations the users attach to their network service.
If a network can maintain an acceptable level of service while minimizing the resources needed to provide this service, we s a y that its operation is network e cient. For example, by statistically multiplexing bursty transmissions, the bandwidth required can often be reduced from that of a pure circuit-switched approach while still meeting the delay requirements of the applications.
If no user currently receiving a particular QOS values it less than another user who is being denied that QOS, we s a y that operation is economically e cient. For example, if one user is willing to pay x per second for undelayed access to a 1 Mbps link, and a second user is willing to pay only x 2 , and if only one of them can be accommodated, then in an economically e cient network the bandwidth will be allocated to the rst user (whether or not they actually pay a n ything).
An obvious question is, why will either type of e ciency continue to be important? Some observers have suggested that the widespread deployment of ber optic lines, and continuing exponential decreases in processor and memory costs, will result in these network resources becoming essentially \free" so that e ciency in their use will not be important in the future, and all users can always be accommodated. We do not believe these arguments apply in the short or medium terms, if indeed they will ever apply. User demands are increasing exponentially, so that it is not clear when|if ever|network resources will be \free". We share the dream of ubiquitous, two-way broadband connectivity a t l o w or zero cost, but believe w e m ust wait at least a few decades to achieve it, despite astonishing technological advances. Consider the cost of providing gigabit bandwidth not just to every home in the industrialized world, but for the other three-quarters of the planet's population as well. Add to that the cost of gigabit mobile communication that will follow each person around town, country and world. And experience suggests that application developers will have little di culty in designing new services that use up all the available resources.
For the foreseeable future, we will continue to live i n a w orld characterized by network resource scarcity. W e will move most quickly towards \free" service if we use our scarce network resources | whether public or private | e ciently in economic terms. Meanwhile, commercial network operators need to be aware of the di ering values that users attach to the same level of network performance. If providers are not responsive to user valuations, they will not succeed in a competitive m a r k et. The same considerations apply even to privately owned or operated networks: the ultimate goal will continue to be to maximize some human measure of the value of using the network, such as pro ts, sales, shareholder value, and so on.
Feedback and adaptive users
Feedback i s a w ell-established method of improving network e ciency. Users of current data networks respond to multiple forms of feedback, on various timescales. On the longest timescale users decide whether or not to use a particular network, perhaps based on the network's charging structure, or their and/or others' previous experience with it. At the connection level, if a user observes that the network is usually heavily loaded at certain times of the day and lightly loaded at others, they may s c hedule their network usage accordingly. On these longer timescales, user responses are usually determined on economic grounds (although not always explicitly). For example, deciding whether or not to set up a connection involves weighing the expected value of using the network against the cost (in money, time, and/or degraded quality) of doing so. Most people are familiar with the decision that it is not \worthwhile" to use the network during busy periods, but instead to do something else and defer their network usage, without necessarily recognizing this process as economic decision-making.
During a connection, adaptive users can adjust their tra c inputs or QOS demands to respond to feedback signals from the network about the current state of network resources. TCP applications use various congestion control algorithms such a s s l o w-start 5] to adjust their input rates to the currently available bandwidth. The ATM Forum is developing an Available Bit Rate (ABR) service in which users who respond \appropriately" to dynamic feedback get loss guarantees from the ATM network 14]. Since it is already accepted that user responses can be automated using pre-programmed network interfaces, fairly sophisticated user behavior can be envisaged, and feedback strategies need not be limited by h uman user response times. The issue becomes one of choosing a feedback signal to modify user behavior in some desired manner.
Adaptive users can help to increase network e ciency if they are given appropriate feedback signals. When the network load is high, the feedback should discourage adaptive users from inputting tra c when the load is low, the feedback should encourage these users to send any tra c they have ready to transmit. In this way m a n y of the congestion problems that occur if the o ered load is regarded as xed can be avoided. One possible feedback signal is a price based on the level of network load: when the load is high, the price is high, and vice-versa. Similarly, b y associating a cost measure with network loading, all users can be signalled with the prices necessary to recover the cost of the current network load. Price-sensitive users|those willing and able to respond to dynamic prices|increase economic e ciency by c hoosing whether or not to input tra c according to their individual willingness to pay the current price. Users who value network service more will choose to transmit, while those who value it less will wait for a lower price. When the network is lightly loaded then the price will be close to zero, and all users can input tra c.
Price signals thus have the potential to increase both network and economic e ciency, though whether a particular pricing scheme increases either notion of e ciency depends on the implementation (see Section 5) . In a public network, where the users cannot be assumed to be cooperative, the more traditional feedback s c hemes as currently used in TCP/IP networks are not robust to user manipulation: it is relatively easy to program a host to ignore the feedback signals. Of course it would be just as easy to ignore price signals but since users would be liable for charges they incurred, there is some incentive to respond (or at least to examine) the value to the user of their network usage.
Price as a form of feedback
Congestion control and feedback control are di cult problems in network operations. Perhaps because of the technical challenges involved, most researchers have ignored two k ey issues (or relegated them to \policy issues") which are nevertheless crucial: how should congestion be de ned and measured? This is a di cult question because individual user requirements vary considerably, so that one user may think the network is congested while another does not and because in internetworks the responsibility for detecting congestion may be distributed among several network operators, each of which applies a di erent test at their bottleneck points. This problem will become more di cult in a multiple-QOS network, in which s e v eral di erent performance characteristics are relevant to di erent applications (e.g. maximum delay, d e l a y jitter, packet loss rate, etc.).
how should limited resources be allocated under congestion? Currently, randomization with First-In/First-Out queueing is used, but some proposals call for users to indicate the relative priority of their tra c | leading to the problem of providing incentives so that all users will not choose the highest priority.
Charges to an Internet user could have s e v eral components, such as a connection fee, a charge per unit time or per unit of bandwidth, premium charges for certain services, and so on. In this paper, we focus attention on only one type of pricing: a responsive component which v aries with the state of network congestion. By responsive p r i c i n g we do not mean a charge which counts the number of bytes or packets regardless of the network conditions. 2 On the contrary, we propose charging only when network congestion indicates that some users may be experiencing QOS degradation, with the size of the charges related to the degree of congestion. If the network is lightly loaded and all users are getting acceptable QOS, the responsive prices would be zero.
Proposing a scheme to allocate network resources and service priorities is not a radical departure: allocation occurs today i n t h e I n ternet. However, the current allocation is implemented on a rst-come, rst-served basis, without any consideration for whether some users value immediate access more highly than others. Given the heterogeneity of user requirements for network performance, responsive pricing would improve economic e ciency by inducing users with low priority tra c to delay i t u n til a burst of congestion eases. Such time-smoothing would not upset users who do not demand low latency, while it would improve the performance of time-sensitive applications which get the highest bene ts from immediate access.
Let us clarify one point: when most people think of prices, they think in monetary terms, e.g. dollars and cents. However, there is nothing inherently monetary in applying pricing principles to communication networks. As long as the appropriate cost and valuation functions can be de ned, a pricing mechanism can be applied even if money is not directly involved. For example, in a private network where one organization controls all the users, the \prices" would be control signals which summarize the state of network resources. In this case the users (or their applications) are cooperative and can be programmed to obtain a desirable tra c mix. 3 We recognize that many people are concerned about the use of pricing in network operations. Concerns range from questions about the feasibility and overhead of usage-sensitive pricing, to more philosophical issues such as pro t opportunities and fairness. While some of these concerns may or may not be borne out by future developments, others are based on misconceptions of what is being proposed or on other non-technical grounds. We do not expect that decisions on pricing will be made solely on technical grounds, but we do believe that a clear understanding of the nature of what is being proposed is necessary on all sides. Therefore we rst describe a framework for responsive pricing, and some of our work on analyzing and simulating various implementations. We then address some of the objections often raised in discussions of dynamic network pricing.
Modeling User Adaptation to Feedback
Our focus is on the interaction between user behavior and the e ciency of the network. Therefore, we w ant to model tra c types that a user can adapt to the state of the network. In this section we discuss the nature of such adaptive applications.
There are several ways in which a user can adapt her tra c load to the network state. Not all of these are equally obvious to the network. For example, a user may h a ve a constant bit-rate (CBR) application that cannot tolerate either delay or loss. If the user does not like the service o ered by the network, she may adapt by connecting to a di erent network, so the original network never sees the load at all.
Alternatively, the user may decide to make a connection, and use it for a CBR and delayintolerant application. However, depending on the state of the network and the service guarantees it o ers, the user may adapt the tra c at source. For example, the user could reduce the number of packets transmitted, by accepting lower delity or precision. Or the user could delay making the connection to a di erent time. In these cases, the network merely sees a CBR source it does not directly observe that the user has adapted.
In another case, a user may o er a load to the network, but accept a best e orts service quality. In this case, the user is abdicating the adaptation to the network. However, if the network accepts all best e orts tra c, then the load o ered to the network is not adapted to the network state. Rather, the burden the tra c imposes is adapted through varying the delay and packet loss. This form of adaptation can be quite costly if a higher layer protocol is resending lost packets: congestion breeds congestion.
Even without pricing, users obviously adapt their network usage in several ways. We p r o p o s e taking advantage of this natural adaptability t o i m p r o ve the e ciency over a short time horizon. We h a ve elsewhere 8], 11] described several di erent t ypes of adaptive users. Inelastic and best e orts are the two m o s t i n teresting for modeling:
Inelastic. An inelastic application requires a delay guarantee, but can tolerate loss and is adaptive. For example, this might be the second level of a two-level codec for video. The rst level is likely to contain the minimum necessary information, and would be transmitted as a non-adaptive application. The second level consists of enhancement information. It is not essential that all of the information be delivered, and it is possible for the user to vary the amount of information transmitted in response to feedback. However, a delay guarantee is required: if the information does not arrive before the playback p o i n t, it is considered useless.
Best E orts. Users with best-e orts applications do not require loss or delay guarantees, and are willing and able to modify the input rate at the network interface. E-mail and le transfer are typical examples.
These two application types are su cient to explore our primary concerns. In particular, with two t ypes we h a ve heterogeneity across applications, and thus are modeling an integrated services network. Further, we are able to model within-type heterogeneity b y specifying users of a given application type who value that application di erently.
Responsive Pricing Schemes
In our simulations we h a ve been comparing three di erent s c hemes for allocating a simple network's resources. The rst is a conventional approach that makes no use of feedback and user adaptation to the network state. The second is a closed-loop form of feedback and adaptation the third is a closed-loop variation we call \tight loop" because it shortens the delay i n t h e c o n trol loop.
No feedback
Our proposal to improve n e t work e ciency through involving the users in session control is somewhat novel, and certainly controversial. Most in the network engineering community seem to assume that a network will (and should?) be tuned for e ciency given a set of admitted user connections. The only room for interaction with the users in this setting is through the connection setup negotiation. Therefore, as a baseline, we simulate a network that does not provide user feedback: users do not adapt to the network state.
A x e d n umber of inelastic sources are always admitted and active. In addition, a number of best e orts applications are active a t a n y g i v en time. To simplify, the number of new best e orts connections each period is held constant, but the number of packets to be delivered by each connection is random, so the number of active connections in any g i v en period after the rst will be random (as varying numbers of connections are completed). The distribution of best e orts message sizes is chosen so that the average load being added to the network in each period is within the tolerance for a reasonable call admission algorithm. However, sometimes the amount o f a c t i v e best e orts tra c will be large, and the network will su er some performance di culties (packet delays and losses).
Closed-loop feedback
Our rst feedback network uses a simple scheme 9], 12]. The network state is measured by bu er occupancy at the gateway. This occupancy is converted int o a p r i c e p e r p a c ket, which is then transmitted back to each active adaptive application. The applications then decide on how m a n y packets to send during the next interval, as described above.
In this network, users send some packets in period t, and network performance is a ected by the aggregate number of packets received during an interval. At the end of period t the network sends a signal back to users based on the network utilization in period t. Users then decide how many packets to send in period t + 1, based on their observed period t performance and their application requirements. This is a closed-loop feedback system with at least a one-period lag between the state of the network and the e ect on the user inputs.
Smart market pricing
A \smart market" approach to adaptation has been proposed in 6]. A user sends packets to the network interface which include in each header a token indicating how m uch the user is willing to pay to get that packet onto the network in the current i n terval. Then, during the pricing interval, the network gateway sorts the \bids" on the incoming packets, and admits to the network only as many as it can accomodate without degrading performance below some bound. 4 The gateway admits packets in descending order of their bid. Users are charged not the amount that they declared they were willing to pay, but the value of the minimum bid on a packet that is admitted to the network. Thus, users pay just the congestion cost (the amount that the highest-value denied packet would have paid for immediate transport) but they get to keep all of the excess value that they attribute to delivery above the cuto bid. This form of pricing by auction has several nice properties, described in 6].
We call this mechanism a tight-loop because the user sends willingness to pay along with the packet, and the network admission and pricing is determined based on those reports and the current state of network congestion, without creating a feedback d e l a y. In practice, there would probably be at least a one-period delay to allow the gateway to determine the approximate cuto bid from packets presented in the prior interval.
Preliminary simulation results
We h a ve been developing a simulation model in which to compare the performance of the di erent allocation schemes in a simple but realistic network environment. To g i v e a sense of the gains that are possible with responsive pricing, we o er some preliminary results that compare no feedback to the closed-loop scheme.
In the simulations we h a ve generated 20 video sources with random frame sizes to represent the inelastic tra c, and between 1 and 39 best e orts data sources with random frame sizes, with the number of active o ws at a given moment c hosen randomly. Under these conditions our network capacity has experienced an average of 80% utilization. When closed-loop pricing is implemented packet loss drops from 19% to under 2%, while the net bene ts perceived by the users increase by 4 In practice, the gateway w ould probably estimate the cuto bid that would admit the number of packets that can be accomodated, using recent information on the bid distribution and perhaps a sample of newly arriving packets. Then the gateway w ould merely route incoming packets into two (or more) queues | one for immediate handling, and one for bu ering and re-entry in the next bid period. When the number of packets being held back exceeded bu er capacity, s o m e w ould be dropped. 
Objections to responsive pricing
We explore some common arguments against responsive pricing in network operations in this Section, and provide some counterpoints. Some previous work along these lines is contained in 7] a n d 10].
Why d o w e need to introduce prices? The Internet is free now | let's keep it that way.
{ Counterpoint: The Internet is not free now, though it seems that way to many users whose universities or organizations pay the access fees. The issue is not whether Internet usage should be priced: it already is. The issue is how the Internet should be priced so that its value to the users is maximized.
Network resources will soon be essentially free, therefore Internet congestion and the accompanying QOS degradation will not be a problem in the future.
{ Counterpoint: This represents an optimistic view of the future, but we do not believe that this will come true in the short or medium terms, if ever. See our arguments on why e ciency will continue to be important in Section 2.
If congestion is caused by bandwidth-intensive users such as real-time video, why don't we just keep these users o the Internet, or limit their number so that they don't cause congestion problems?
{ Counterpoint: Keeping these users o the Internet means keeping the Internet low-tech and continuing the best-e ort no-guarantees paradigm. This runs contrary to the trend towards integrated-services networks, and may cause the Internet to miss out on innovative information transfer and retrieval mechanisms. Apart from the administrative issues, why should \low-tech" users be allowed to veto \high-tech" users? And what will the general public want when they come online?
Why w on't some non-pricing scheme be enough? Administrative c o n trols can be used to impose some appropriate notion of fairness, for example or users can choose a tra c priority level which matches their requirements.
{ Counterpoint: Who decides what is fair? The network operator can but according
to a user-oriented objective, fairness should be determined collectively by the users. We might all agree that telesurgery is more important than email, but what about interactive video games versus email? Also, every time a new application is developed it has to be slotted into the priority order, an increasingly complex process. Further, the value of an application to a given user will vary over time. Priorities for di erent applications will sometimes | perhaps usually | incorrectly order valuations. Suppose the network simply supports priority l e v els and allows each u s e r t o c hoose their own level. Why w ouldn't they all choose the highest priority? To guard against such abuses, there would have to be some penalty for \inappropriate" declarations, implying the need to de ne \appropriate" priority levels or to assign increasing charges to higher priorities (see e.g. 2]). A user's choice of priority l e v el would then be based on economic considerations: balancing the bene ts of higher priority against the costs and/or the penalties for in ating their application's perceived priority l e v el. This is the essence of a pricing scheme.
Most users will want to know their charges in advance, and will not want to deal with prices that change during the lifetime of a typical connection. Why w on't at-fee prices (per minute connected, or per kbps of the access link) be enough?
{ Counterpoint: W e are not advocating that all users must face responsive prices. Any user can choose not to face dynamic prices, even if their application is adaptive. They would then be charged according to some other pricing scheme. For example, a user might be allowed to pay zero responsive prices in exchange for getting only best e orts service with lower priority than other users who pay a positive price. In any realistic pricing scheme it would be possible for a user to set the maximum charge they are willing to pay, which is what is usually required for budgetary purposes. We should also point out that at-fee pricing is really long-term usage pricing, so even \ at" fees include a usage-based component: it's just averaged over a period much longer than a connection lifetime. 5 Bits/bytes/cells/packets are not the correct units to charge for | it's information that users care about. Any s c heme which proposes to look inside every packet to determine how it relates to other packets is likely to be too complex to be justi ed. Also, lower-layer mechanisms (such as Ethernet collisions) or packet losses requiring retransmissions make it di cult to predict how m uch \raw" data has to be transferred to transmit a given amount of information. Should users be charged for retransmissions that they have no control over, or packets which are dropped by the network?
{ Counterpoint: Our proposal involves pricing for transport, not for content. The \impor-tance" of a particular packet, and its relation to other packets, is a higher-layer issue determined by the application (or ultimately by the users). We are not proposing that the network be aware of these issues on the contrary, with responsive pricing it's up to the users to decide how p a c kets are used to transfer information. It's true that it is in general impossible to determine beforehand exactly how m a n y p a c kets are required to transmit a block of information, but again this is a higher-layer issue. Indeed, there will be some e ciency gains from providing a nancial incentive to software developers to make more e cient use of network packet transport. The important question is whether the users or the network should bear the uncertainty arising from variations in congestion. If the network is expected to o er a \ le transfer" service, the le transfer charge per megabyte could be computed by a veraging over many such transfers. If the user is expected to pay for all transmitted packets, they could de ne a maximum number of packets they are willing to transmit per megabyte of information, and invoke a n application-layer process if this threshold is exceeded.
Dynamic pricing schemes are unworkable in practice due to the overheads involved in accounting and billing for usage on such a detailed level. In addition, a signi cant portion of the revenue raised is needed to defray the cost of doing dynamic pricing in the rst place! { Counterpoint: The costs of dynamic pricing may outweigh the bene ts for a particular implementation but we do not believe this is necessarily true for all dynamic pricing schemes. In particular, online pricing mechanisms may reduce the actual cost to an acceptable level there is no reason to think that current billing and accounting costs in other industries, such as telephone or electricity n e t works, will necessarily apply to dynamic pricing in the Internet. In particular, since data networks have v ast distributed computing power in the form of smart end-user devices at the periphery, i t m a y b e possible to design distributed billing systems that have v ery low cost for large numbers of small transactions.
Dynamic pricing is impractical because users cannot respond to prices which are updated many times per second. If the update interval is increased to the minimum period in which users can respond, congestion can arise and disperse in between price updates, so that prices no longer in uence user behaviour.
{ Counterpoint: Our scheme assumes an intelligent n e t work interface at price-sensitive user sites, so the processing necessary to respond to dynamic prices would be done automatically based on pre-programmed user preferences. For example, a user could have a default preference in her email program that instructed the software to hold outgoing email whenever the price exceeds 0.01 cents per packet. Such s o f t ware would play a similar role to current TCP implementations, which respond to network feedback by adjusting their tra c inputs, except that the feedback in our case is the current price.
Once a network is installed, any load-dependent costs of transferring data are minimal | the xed costs of network management and maintenance dominate. These xed costs can be e ciently recovered through connection fees and capacity prices (proportional to the size of the access link). Why implement an elaborate pricing mechanism to recover the relatively small variable costs?
{ Counterpoint: T h e p o i n t is not current c o s t r e c o very. We are concerned about the congestion cost which one user's tra c imposes on other users sharing the resources. Bandwidth or bu er space occupied by one user's tra c is not available to other users. When this reduces other users' quality of service (through increased delays, loss rates, blocking probabilities, and so on), they su er congestion costs which m a y translate into signi cant actual costs of service degradation. One mechanism to capture these costs is a price which is sensitive to some indicator of congestion, such a s l o a d .
Even if we w ant to allocate according to congestion costs, how can the network determine what actual costs the current load is imposing on users who probably have w i d e l y v arying service requirements? Getting users to reveal these costs is likely to be extremely complicated, if not impossible.
{ Counterpoint: I t i s t r u e t h a t p r o viding users with the right incentives to reveal their actual costs of service degradation is complicated. It is not impossible however: truthful revelation is one of the properties of the smart market mechanism in 6]. With any prices that increase with the degree of congestion in the network, users will be induced to prioritize their tra c. Only users who value their tra c at least as much as the current price will transmit. If congestion remains unacceptably high, then the associated price was too low conversely if capacity is unacceptably underutilized, the price was too high. Thus, through a process of experimentation and dynamic adjustment, the network can shape the price schedule so that users approximately reveal their valuations for uncongested service through their responses to the price feedback.
Charging for transmission fails to capture cases where the bene t of a transfer is with the receiver. If senders are charged for receiver-initiated transfers, we could see a drastic reduction in the number of open-access servers with a corresponding decrease in the value of using the network.
{ Counterpoint: The problem of allocating the bene ts of a particular information transfer is a higher-layer issue. We do not believe that associating the charge for a transmission with the sender constrains the actual ow o f m o n e y i n a n y w ay. It is easy to imagine multiparty connection protocols which initially negotiate each p a r t y's responsibility for the total charge, or \reverse-charges" servers which only transmit data once the receiver has indicated willingness to pay the resulting transmission costs. Just as in telephony, we can expect \1-800", \1-900" and other billing services to arise.
Suppose we institute some form of responsive pricing, and users (especially the high-bandwidth ones who will pay the most) leave the Internet and use other networks. Won't that reduce the value of being on the Internet, perhaps to the point where even small users leave and join the other networks?
{ Counterpoint: W e are discussing only charging users for the amount of congestion cost they impose on other users. Users get to decide whether they want t o p a y money to avoid congestion, or not pay money and bear congestion delays | in the current I n ternet, everyone is forced to accept the latter alternative. Costs are not just monetary: if the cost of congestion delay i s s e v ere, then we can expect that some users are already being driven away. Indeed, many n e t work applications are restricted to private leased-line networks to avoid Internet congestion (e.g. most videoconferencing). By allowing transport priorities to be sorted based on who su ers the most from congestion delay, w e will increase the value of the network, which should spawn additional growth and new uses.
Why a r e w e so concerned with modifying individual user behavior anyway? Surely one user can't do that much damage to the Internet?
{ Counterpoint: One user, or a relatively tiny n umber of users, can now do a lot of damage to the Internet. A single interactive video connection can take u p a s m uch bandwidth as thousands of traditional Internet applications. Without some incentives to take other users into account (and/or penalties when they do not), a small fraction of the user base could bring large regions of the Internet to a standstill. In any case, the collective behavior of lots of individuals, acting without concern about the e ects of their tra c on others, can easily lead to congestion. We think it most natural and e cient to attack the problem at source, but it may be that feasible responsive pricing schemes are more practical if imposed at a higher level of aggregation.
There is already a penalty for heavy network usage: my application runs slower. Why should I p a y again, in real money?
{ Counterpoint: Y our application running slower represent s a p e n a l t y t o y ou, but what about other users' applications which are also running slower? In order to fairly share resources, you have to be made aware of the costs your usage imposes on other users. If there is enough of the shared resources, these congestion costs can be insigni cant. But we believe that the Internet cannot rely on these costs being essentially zero, at least not for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, some forms of responsive pricing give the user a choice: either pay i n d e l a y, o r p a y i n m o n e y t o a void delay. T h i s c hoice is available on a gross scale today: we can use the Internet with uncontrolled delays, or use a low-delay p r i v ate leased network. We think it is possible to o er this pay-or-delay choice to users within the Internet, making them better o by giving them a wider range of service choices.
With any form of responsive pricing, it's the small users who will su er the most. Rich users could behave as they want since they have the resources, and could e ectively limit the network access of smaller users. The role of the Internet as a medium for information exchange between all-comers will be lost! { Counterpoint: Absolutely not! Quite the opposite. Suppose that the network is supported only by connection fees. The connection fee will then be set based on the average usage for a connection of a given size. Then the small users will be paying more than their share to support the heavy users. A corollary to this myth is that the user cost of the Internet will increase if responsive pricing is introduced. The whole purpose of responsive pricing is to make the network more e cient, and to raise the value for users. Thus, if implemented intelligently, w e w i l l g e t more value out of a netwo r k o f g i v en cost. For a network of xed size, we c a n l o wer the connection fees by an amount equal to the congestion fees and still recover costs, so total outlays are the same but the network has higher value. Or we could use the congestion revenues to invest in a bigger, more valuable network facility. It is also worth remembering that with responsive p r i c i n g , y ou pay f o r y our actual usage in terms of the cost it imposes on other users. If all you want t o u s e t h e I n ternet for is email and netnews, your charges under responsive pricing would be zero because these are exible applications and do not require real-time performance or guaranteed bandwidth. As for rich users being able to a ord to ignore dynamic prices, this is true under any pricing scheme and is a larger issue concerning the distribution of wealth in a s o c i e t y. 6 Responsive pricing is just another way for network operators to make more money. Users will lose out as network operators maximise their pro ts.
{ Counterpoint: It's true that there is the potential for pro teering whenever prices are charged, especially when the conditions under which prices are set are not immediately accessible to ordinary users. But in a competitive e n vironment, network operators have market incentives to keep their margins of revenue over actual cost as low as possible. This incentive is missing in the case of a monopoly provider or a cartel of price-xing providers. But whether abuse is possible in this case depends on policy and regulatory decisions rather than on the speci c pricing scheme. And responsive prices eliminate the cross-subsidization of heavy users by l i g h ter users inherent in at-fee or connection prices.
By introducing responsive pricing, the traditional Internet culture (which emphasizes openness and sharing) will be destroyed, and it will become just another commercial service.
{ Counterpoint: I t ' s t r u e t h a t b y c hanging the pricing scheme used in the Internet, the culture will also change. However the culture is changing anyway due to the strains imposed by the demands of the ever-increasing user population. The question is, how can this change be managed so that overall user satisfaction with the Internet is maximized? Insisting that the Internet remain a connection-fee only network consigns it to ever-lessening value as usage and congestion increases, and new, QOS-sensitive applications are developed that cannot be successfully implemented in a rst-come-rst-served network. Many users are already eeing the increasingly noisy Internet shifting some responsibility for congestion control out to the users, and treating them as smart rather than dumb devices, will help preserve those parts of the Internet that users most value preserving.
We don't know what the future Internet will look like, so it would be a mistake to adopt a responsive pricing scheme which i s s o c o n troversial | it could sti e innovation and cause the Internet to miss out on opportunities to enhance its value to society.
{ Counterpoint: Equally, b y not introducing some additional forms of congestion control, the Internet may miss out on future growth and improvements. For example, the Internet may be consigned to missing the widespread deployment of real-time interactive video if better mechanisms for conrolling congestion are not developed. We propose one particular form of congestion control based on economic principles of pricing for resource allocation. Price is one possible feedback signal which has some attractive properties (compactness, quanti able, etc.). Economists have d e v eloped a large body of theory of pricing mechanisms, and there is a lot of experience with the use of prices in real-world markets. However we do not rule out the possibility that there are other feedback mechanisms that, for one reason or another, may be preferable in communication networks.
Conclusions
Many proposals have been made to incorporate feedback i n to network control and resource allocation schemes, such as TCP congestion control and avoidance algorithms or ABR service in ATM networks. We suggest taking these proposals one step further by explicitly de ning how that feedback is generated by the network, and what form it takes. In responsive pricing, the network announces a price which is based on the cost of using network resources, and price-sensitive users adjust their tra c inputs based on this price and their own speci cation of how v aluable network service is to them.
What we propose is to give users incentives to consider the e ects of their usage on other users. While users may o r m a y not behave \considerately" in a privately-owned network, it appears that some incentives will always be necessary in commercial networks. We also address the issue of user valuation of the service, and allow for some sources to have more demanding tra c than others regardless of the type of applications involved. Simulations show that it is possible to gain both network e ciency and economic e ciency by using pricing. In other words, the network actually carries more tra c and carries more important tra c from the users' point of view.
